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I 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die Europäische Kommission verfolgt in ihrer Strategie “Europe 2020” das Konzept einer  
“intelligenten, nachhaltigen und integrativen Wirtschaft“, das mit Verbesserungen in den 
Bereichen grüner Produktion und grünen Konsums einhergeht. In diesem Konzept sind die 
Einführung und Diffusion von Umweltinnovationen durch Unternehmen ein Schlüssel für die 
Verbesserung der Nachhaltigkeit des Produktionsprozesses, sowohl bezüglich des integrierten 
Umweltschutzes (Cleaner Production measures) als auch bezüglich nachgeschalteter 
Maßnahmen (End-of-Pipe technologies). 
Während über die Determinanten von Umweltinnovationen in der Literatur wachsende 
Einigkeit besteht, werden die ökonomischen Implikationen ihrer Adoption immer noch 
kontrovers diskutiert. Müssen Unternehmen auf rentablere Investitionen verzichten, wenn sie 
ihre Ressourcen der Verbesserung ihrer ökologischen Performance widmen? Oder handelt es 
sich um einen neuen Wachstumspfad, der auch Renditen verspricht? Zahlreiche 
Forschungsprojekte haben sich auf verschiedenen Untersuchungsebenen der Analyse dieser 
Frage gewidmet, ohne eine klare Antwort zu geben ob sich eine grüne Performance auszahlt 
oder nicht. 
Unser Beitrag zur Diskussion besteht in einer Differenzierung zwischen verschiedenen Typen 
von Umweltinnovationen. Unser wesentliches Argument ist, dass die Antwort auf die Frage 
davon abhängt, auf welche Weise ökologisch innoviert wird. Mit anderen Worten: Die “Black 
Box” von Umweltinnovationen muss geöffnet werden, um ihre Auswirkungen auf die 
Wettbewerbsfähigkeit differenzieren zu können.  
Empirische Evidenz für dieses Argument finden wir in Daten zum Innovationsverhalten 
deutscher Unternehmen, die wir aus zwei Wellen des Mannheimer Innovationspanels für die 
Jahre 2011 und 2009 zusammengestellt haben. Unser Ergebnis lautet, dass die Frage a priori 
nicht beantwortet werden kann. Stattdessen ist der Typ von Umweltinnovationen zu 
spezifizieren. Effizienzverbessernde Innovationen wie beispielsweise Maßnahmen zur 
Erhöhung der Energie- und Materialeffizienz weisen eine positive Wirkung auf die 
ökonomische Performance von Unternehmen aus. Negativ sind die Wettbewerbswirkungen 
dagegen bei jenen Umweltinnovationen, die lediglich negative externe Effekte der Produktion 
internalisieren, wie beispielsweise die Reduktion von Lärm-, Luft-, Boden- und 
Wasserbelastungen. Während diese Innovationen – je nach Stand der Umweltregulierung – 
langfristig durchaus profitabel sein können, zahlen sie sich kurzfristig bei gegebener 
Umweltregulierung nicht aus. 
Bevor eine Umweltinnovation positive Wettbewerbswirkungen zeigt, müssen zunächst 
bestimmte Schwellenwerte erreicht werden. Unsere Analysen zeigen, dass nur sehr 
umweltinnovative Unternehmen nach Einführung einer Umweltinnovation Variationen in 
ihrer Profitabilität aufweisen. 
 
II 
Non-technical Summary 
The achievement of the goals set by the broad 10-year growth strategy “Europe 2020” of the 
European Commission, aiming by 2020 at a smart, sustainable and more inclusive economy, 
is intertwined with improvements towards greener production processes. The generation and 
adoption of Environmental Innovations by firms are consequently keys to improve the 
sustainability of the production processes, either when innovations are integrated in the 
production process (Cleaner Production measures), or when innovations are add-on measures 
(End-of-Pipe technologies). Whereas a consensus on the determinants of Environmental 
Innovations seems to be growing, still widely debated are the economic implications of their 
adoption. Are firms missing economic opportunities when they commit resources to improve 
their environmental performances, or is it true the opposite? A deep research effort has been 
devoted to the analysis of the economic performance effects of improvements in the 
environmental performances, at various levels of analysis, but still no clear answer has been 
provided to the question whether it pays or not to be green. 
We contribute to this debate by proposing a differentiation between different typologies of 
Environmental Innovations. Our main argument is that it depends on how to be green, i.e. the 
“box” of Environmental Innovations has to be opened to disentangle the competitiveness 
effect of their adoption. We find support to this argument by using data on German firms 
extracted from the merge of two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel for the years 2011 
and 2009. Our results suggest that profitability gains depend on the typology of innovation 
considered. In other terms, it cannot be argued a priori whether it pays or not to adopt greener 
production processes, as it is needed to specify the typology of innovation considered. 
Efficiency improving innovations, such as those innovations that reduce the use of materials 
or energy per unit of output are found to positively impact firms’ economic performances. 
Contrarily, some negative profitability effects might be associated with innovations that are 
targeted at reducing production negative externalities, such as reduction of air, soil, water and 
noise pollution as well as those to replace dangerous materials. Although they may be 
profitable in the long run due to improved environmental regulation, it does not pay off in the 
short run when environmental regulation has to be faced as an external restriction. 
The existence of a threshold before innovations can engender profitability gains is also 
depicted, as only highly eco-innovative firms are facing profitability variations after the 
adoption of environmental innovations.  
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Abstract 
Much of the empirical literature analysing the relation between environmental innovation and 
competitiveness has focused on the question whether “it pays to be green”. We differentiate between 
different types of environmental innovations, which will be disentangled in those aiming at reducing 
the negative externalities and those allowing for efficiency increases and cost savings. What we 
analyze is at first the extent to which these two typologies have impacts on firms’ profitability with 
opposite signs, and, secondly, whether the motivations driving the adoption of those innovations make 
the difference in terms of economic gains. We find empirical evidence that both the typology of 
Environmental Innovation and the driver of their adoption affect the sign of the relationship between 
competitiveness and environmental performance. The empirical strategy is based on a sample of 
German firms and makes use of a merge of two waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel in 2011 and 
2009 that allow overcoming some endogeneity issues which may arise in a cross-section setting.  
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1 Introduction 
The broad 10-year growth strategy “Europe 2020” of the European Commission, aiming at a smart, 
sustainable and more inclusive economy” by 2020 (EC, 2010), is depending upon improvements 
towards a greener production that may lead to a “decoupling” of environmental pressure and economic 
growth. The generation and adoption of Environmental Innovations (from now on EI1) by firms are 
consequently keys to improve the sustainability of the production processes. This holds either when 
innovations are integrated in the production process (Cleaner Production measures) or when 
innovations are add-on measures that allow to reduce the negative externalities of the production in the 
last stage of the production process, for example by including specific filters to reduce pollution 
(end-of-pipe technologies). Previous literature has highlighted the peculiar nature of EI (e.g. Horbach, 
2008; Rennings, 1998, 2000) and, suggesting the need of a multidisciplinary approach (e.g. Kemp, 
2010), has recently contributed to a better understanding and identification of the determinants that are 
beyond the generation and the adoption of EI within firms.  
Whereas a consensus on the determinants of EI2 seems to be growing, the economic implications of 
their adoption are still widely debated, to understand whether firms are missing (getting) economic 
opportunities in improving (not improving) their environmental performances. We contribute to this 
debate on whether it pays or not to “be green” by proposing a differentiation between different 
typologies of EI. Our main argument is that it depends on how to be green, i.e. the “box” of EI has to 
be opened to disentangle the competitiveness effect of their adoption. Some neutral or even negative 
profitability effects might be associated with EI that are only aiming at reducing negative production 
externalities, while some positive economic benefits are indeed expected when EI are cost saving 
and/or efficiency improving innovations. Our corollary argument is that what drives the adoption of EI 
can influence the competitive outcome of the EI itself. Section II discusses the theoretical framework 
our research is based upon. The empirical analysis is carried out on the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
dataset for the years 2011 and 2009 and will be made clear in Section III. Section IV provides a 
discussion of our results and highlights a set of robustness checks we implemented to reinforce our 
estimates. Section V concludes. 
2 Theoretical framework 
A deep research effort has been devoted to the analysis of the economic performance effects of 
improvements in the environmental performances at various levels of analysis, where economic 
performance has been conceived through short-term measures, such as profitability or even longer 
term measures that capture firms’ competitiveness. While still no clear answer has been provided, the 
research question whether it pays or not to be green has existed for a long time.   
                                                     
1 Multiple and exhaustive definitions of EI have been provided by the literature (e.g. Kemp and Pearson 2007; Kemp, 2010; 
Rennings, 2000). Among them, the one we will be referring to is the following: “the production, assimilation or exploitation 
of a product, production process, service or management or business methods that is novel to the firm [or organization] and 
which results, throughout its life cycle, in a reduction of environmental risk, pollution and other negative impacts of 
resources use (including energy use) compared to relevant alternatives” (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2007, p. 10). 
2  The extant literature has mainly agreed on the relevance of a cluster of EI determinants, mainly Market-pull, 
Technology-push, Firm specific factors and Regulation (e.g. Horbach et al., 2012; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005; Wagner, 2008; 
Rennings and Rexhäuser, 2010; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009). The access to knowledge sources coming from outside the 
firms’ boundaries is more recently also found to be relevant (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005): relying on external knowledge 
sources is indeed positively influencing the adoption of EI and the enlargement of an EI portfolio within firms (Ghisetti et al., 
2013) and cooperating in R&D is far more important for EI than for technological innovations (De Marchi, 2012). 
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A first useful insight comes from the broad literature on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (e.g. 
Porter and Kramer, 2002 and 2006), given the central role of environmental responsibility in such a 
framework (e.g. Hart, 1997; Orlitzky et al. 2011). According to these studies, irrespective of whether 
the adoption of cleaner technologies can be a by-product of a strategy aiming at improving firms’ 
market evaluation, or the access to new (green) markets, or as part of a cost-reduction strategy (Ambec 
and Lanoie, 2008), such an adoption might still engender positive business performance effects. 
Furthermore, according to the natural-resource-based view3 (NRBV) of the firm, it is expected that 
firms’ profitability is positively influenced by the competitive advantages generated by the accounting 
of the natural environment as this pro-active behavior favors the development of strategic resources 
that are engendering positive economic returns (Hart, 1995). Ecosystem degradation and resources 
depletion engender a threat to firms’ resources (Hart and Dowell, 2011), and as a reaction, firms can 
pro-actively adopt an environmental strategy (Hart, 1995), which can be read as the development of a 
dynamic capability (Aragon-Correa and Sharma, 2003). To this respect, firms facing higher risks 
associated to climate change are those subject to greater incentives to develop green strategies 
(Hoffman, 2005). Moreover, the idea that it pays to be green became even more attractive when it was 
linked to the NRBV as “it is a theory of how an individual firm might gain a competitive advantage by 
going green” (Berchicchi and King, 2007: 516). The economic benefits deriving from pollution 
reduction are, however, usually underestimated by managers (e.g. Hart, 1995; Berchicchi and King, 
2007 for a discussion) and this might lead to sub-optimal levels of environmental efforts if it is 
acknowledged that innovations might more than offset the cost of compliance to stringent 
environmental standards (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). This underestimation can be driven by the 
costs associated to collecting proper information about the values and returns of different pollution 
reduction factors as firms can be unwilling to bear the search costs and thus can underexploit or abuse 
certain “greener” production techniques (King and Lenox, 2002). Waste prevention processes, for 
instance, have proved to be underexploited because of their not-directly-observable benefits (e.g. King 
and Lenox, 2002; Russo and Fouts, 1997).     
 
Given this framework of analysis, a range of empirical studies have been devoted to test the 
relationship between financial and environmental performance in a firm-level analysis. Those studies 
provided a very mixed picture on the signs of this relation and on the empirical strategies to be 
adopted. According to Horváthová (2010), 15% of them found a negative, 55% a positive, and 30% 
found no effect of environmental performances on economic performance. In studying the profitability 
effects, measured as Returns on Equity (ROE), of environmental performance ratings in the pulp and 
paper industry, Bragdon and Marlin (1972) found support that it pays to be green. The same positive 
sign, but with different measures of financial performance, can also be found in Russo and Fouts 
(1997), adopting Returns on Assets (ROA), in Salama (2005), assessing the Corporate Financial 
Performance, and in King and Lenox (2001) and Dowell et al. (2000), adopting the Tobins’q index. 
King and Lenox (2002) provided some further insights by showing that the positive correlation 
between financial and environmental performance were driven by a particular type of practice, i.e. the 
waste prevention methods. A confirmation that less polluting firms benefit from improved financial 
performances also comes from Hart and Ahuja (1996), who furthermore highlighted that Operating 
                                                     
3 The NRBV somehow challenges the Resource Based View of the firm as it ignored how the interaction 
between an organisation and its natural environment helps explaining the competitive advantages (Hart, 1995). 
According to this view, and without the willingness to be exhaustive, three key strategic capabilities are at stake: 
pollution prevention, product stewardship, and sustainable development, each of them facing different drivers, 
building upon different resources and engendering heterogeneous competitive advantages (Hart and Dowell, 
2011).  
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Performance (Returns on Sales (ROS) and ROA) was benefiting from the year after the initiation of 
pollution prevention strategies, while it required 2 years before financial performance (in terms of 
ROE) was positively affected. To overcome the simultaneity problem that may arise in a cross section 
setting, i.e. that environmental and economic performance usually go hand in hand as they are jointly 
determined and jointly depending on the unobservable firms’ management strategy, Al Tuwaijri et al. 
(2004) adopted a Three Stages Least Squares estimation (following Ullmann, 1985) and still found 
support of a positive relationship between environmental and economic performance.    
 
Contrarily to those evidences, in studying the effect of environmental performance on financial 
performances measured as ROS on a sample of US firms in a cross-section setting, Cordeiro and 
Sarkis (1997) found support for short-term negative effects, which were stronger for pollution 
prevention strategies than for end-of-pipe measures. A negative effect on the Return on Capital 
Employed (RoCE) was also found in the European context, in particular, on the European paper 
industry using a simultaneous structural model, but when adopting different measurements for the 
financial performance, such as ROE or ROS, the effect was no longer significant (Wagner et al., 
2002). Similarly, a neutral effect is also detected by Freeman and Jaggi (1992). However, Elsayed and 
Paton (2005) suggested that previous mixed results were driven by misspecification issues, which 
were due to the inability of previous contributes to properly account for unobserved firms’ fixed 
effects. In confronting a static and a dynamic panel analysis on UK data, they found that 
environmental performance has only a weak impact on the financial performance as outlined by their 
dynamic specification, while the cross-section one suggested stronger (biased) correlations. 
Coherently, Telle (2006) argued the conclusion that “it pays to be green” is premature, as when 
applying a random effect panel model instead of a pooled OLS one, the positive economic gains of 
environmental performances were no longer significant.  
These heterogeneous results pointed to the conclusion that the question is no longer if it does pay to be 
green, but rather when or for whom it pays (Telle, 2006; King and Lenox, 2001). 
We argue that the question has to be better qualified in terms of the typologies of environmental 
innovations to be considered as what we expect is that different EI engender heterogeneous 
competitiveness effects in a firm-level analysis. Thus, we formulate the research question as “How 
does it pay to go green?”.  
EI can indeed be decomposed into at least two typologies, Energy and Resource Efficiency 
Innovations (from now on EREI), i.e. those innovations whose effects consist in a reduction of 
material and energy used per unit of output, and Externality Reducing Innovations (ER from now on), 
i.e. those innovations aimed at reducing production externalities such as air, water, noise pollution and 
harmful materials. Although both EREI and ER face the “double externality problem” typical for EI, 
as they still produce innovation spillover and reduce negative production externalities, empirical 
evidences have been provided that the two typologies are inherently different, either in the drivers (e.g. 
EREI benefit more from the use of external information sources) or in the productivity (sales over 
employees) or in the role of barriers to innovation, which are perceived as more intense for EREI than 
for other EI (Rennings and Rammer, 2011). Evidence is also found that the effects of firm’s “green” 
investment strategy improve firm’s productive efficiency only when the investment in cleaner 
production technologies is targeted at reducing (simultaneously) both the externalities and the use of 
raw materials (Antonietti and Marzucchi, 2013). Furthermore, firms’ ability to generate profits may 
differ, depending on their resource bases, between those that respond to a policy compliance by 
introducing end-of-pipe innovations and those that redesign their production processes and services 
(Russo and Fouts, 1997). The introduction of end-of-pipe technologies does not fundamentally modify 
production processes, thus it does not alter neither firms’ resources nor capabilities. Consequently, it is 
5 
not expected to engender any positive effects on firms’ competitiveness, while it can rather be just a 
cost burden to the firm and leading to negative outcomes. Improved environmental performances are 
indeed expected to engender positive competitive gains when a change in the resource bases and 
capabilities follows the redesign of the production process (Russo and Fouts, 1997). As EREI are 
actually leading to a reduction in the use of physical resources, they can consequently be a source of 
competitive advantage and thus they are expected to exert a positive effect on firms’ profitability. 
Investments in end-of pipe technologies are instead found to be associated with lower performance 
(Klassen and Whybark, 1999), thus we can expect a different sign for ER. 
Coherently our main hypothesis is that profitability effects of EI are heterogeneous and depend on the 
typology considered. EREI are expected to positively affect profitability, as they can lead to a “win 
win” situation in which the improvement of environmental performance is leading to economic gains. 
Furthermore, the idiosyncratic characteristics of the resources energy and materials might lead firms to 
benefit of a competitive advantage when they introduce EREI. ER are instead less related to the 
exploitation in the production process of scares resources that may engender competitive advantages, 
in case are uniquely exploited and combined. Those are though not expected to lead to positive 
profitability gains, as no “win win” situation might be related to their adoption. 
Secondly, we test whether the motivations behind firms’ decisions to adopt EREI or ER may 
themselves impact on their profitability gains. In particular we are going to test whether EREI or ER 
introduced in response to a current or foreseen regulation (EREI_REG and ER_REG) engender 
different profitability gains compared to EREI or ER introduced as a reaction to the availability of 
financial incentives, grants or subsidies specifically targeted at introducing EI (EREI_GR and 
ER_GR), and also compared to EREI or EI that were voluntarily introduced by firms thanks to the 
existence of voluntary codes or agreements for good environmental practices (EREI_VOL and 
ER_VOL).   
As far as EI introduced as a response to regulation are concerned, a wide strand of research emerged to 
test the existence of a Porter-like mechanism in assessing the competitiveness effects of the adoption 
of a stringent environmental regulation. On the one side, environmental regulation has been seen as a 
threat to firms’ competitiveness (e.g. Gollop and Roberts, 1983) or as a cause that induces firms to 
relocate their production in less regulated areas as the literature on the pollution haven hypothesis 
points out (e.g. Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004 for a survey). On the other side, since the seminal 
contribution by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995), a strand of literature aimed at 
testing the presence of a possible “win-win” solution has emerged, which may arise after the 
introduction of an environmental regulation4 (Beise and Rennings, 2005). Since Porter sees resource 
                                                     
4 Several empirical studies provided a confirmation of this Hypothesis and it is not the aim of the current work to provide an 
exhaustive revision of such a wide and articulated research field. What we are willing to highlight is that, according to the 
Porter Hypothesis, strict regulation is not necessarily damaging competitiveness, but can indeed often enhance it (Porter, 
1991) as a properly designed regulation may indeed trigger innovation allowing to offset, partially or fully, the cost of 
complying to those standards (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Pollution is not only a production externality that diverts the 
costs from the firm to the whole society, as seen in the standard approaches, but it is often also a waste of resources for the 
firm, for example in terms of energy-inefficient production processes. Consequently, a properly designed regulation might 
call  firms’ attention about these inefficiencies and suggest technological improvements leading firms to a Pareto 
improvement, coupling environmental protection with competitiveness enhancement (Ambec et al., 2013).  Moreover, the 
introduction of a specific regulation in one industry j in a specific country i, may engender a “first mover” competitive 
advantage to the firms located in i and belonging to j when compared to firms belonging to countries that will be introducing 
such environmental constraints only in a further period (e.g. Beise and Rennings, 2005). A confirmation of the hypothesis 
comes from several empirical studies, for instance, Rassier and Earnhart (2010) found that the Clean Air Act regulation has 
improved the ROS both in the short and in the long run in a sample of publicly owned firms in the US chemical 
manufacturing industry and Lanoie et al. (2008), studying the effects of the stringency of regulation and Total Factor 
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efficiency as a part of firms total efficiency, his hypothesis would imply that mainly EREI show 
positive effects on competitiveness, while the effects of ER depend on the degree that environmental 
external effects are already internalised by regulation. Mixed results have emerged in the empirical 
literature on the Porter hypothesis. Rexhäuser and Rammer (2013) were the first who properly 
distinguished between EREI and ER in testing for the existence of a Porter-like mechanism and indeed 
found a confirmation of the Porter hypothesis only for EREI, which exert a positive effect on firms’ 
profitability either when they are or are not regulation driven, while negative effects are exerted by 
ER5.  
What follows is our second hypothesis that profitability effects of EREI and ER vary according to the 
motivation that was driving their adoption by firms as each of the three motivations may affect the 
adoption of heterogeneous innovations and this is moderating the profitability effects of the innovation 
itself.  Regulation driven EI are mainly leading to an internalisation of negative externalities which 
can also be beneficial to the firm, according to the argument articulated so far and coherently with the 
Porter Hypothesis. On the other side, financial incentives are usually provided for the introduction of 
innovations that are not profitable on their own, thus moderating the adoption of less profitable EI, 
which are in our case ER rather than EREI, while voluntary adopted EI are expected to lead mainly to 
cost saving innovations rather than to innovations which are perceived as a cost-burden to the firms. 
3 Empirical strategy  
3.1 Data 
The empirical test of our research hypothesis makes use of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an 
annual survey based on a panel sample of German firms conducted by the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim. 
The 2009 wave of the MIP includes a set of questions on EI that are coherent with the European 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 2006-2008. The advantage of the MIP with respect to the CIS 
lies in the fact that it also surveys information on firm profitability and market structure that allows 
building our dependent and control variables. Furthermore, as it will be outlined below, we benefited 
from the opportunity to merge 2 waves of the survey in order to lag the explanatory variables with 
respect to the dependent one. The target population are enterprises with 5 or more employees from 
most economic sectors6 and the sample is stratified by sector (56 sectors at the 2-digit level of NACE 
rev. 2.), size class (8 classes according to the number of employees) and region (West Germany and 
East Germany). The voluntary nature of the survey is the reason for a response rate that is lower than 
in compulsory surveys (in 2009 it was 26 percent)7. More importantly, a non-respondent test has been 
implemented to test the presence of a selection bias in the responses and this excluded the existence of 
systemic differences between respondents and non-respondents.  
The operative sample used in this research consists of 1063 observations, which is equal to the 15% of 
the total sample of the MIP 2009. The loss of observations is due to the fact that the samples of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Productivity growth in Quebec manufacturing sector, found that the effects are stronger for industries more exposed to 
international competition and positive in the long run while negative in the short run.  
5  Nevertheless, the negative effect disappears for ER which are driven by current or expected regulation, while it is 
persistently negative for ER which are not regulation-driven. 
6 Excluding farming and forestry, hotels and restaurants, public administration, health, education, and personal and cultural 
services. For further details on the MIP, see Janz et al. (2001) and Aschhoff et al. (2013). 
7 But it is not an unusual response rate for voluntary mail surveys in Germany (Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010). 
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two waves of the MIP that we merged, i.e. the MIP 2009 and the MIP 2011, did not include the same 
firms, to the high attrition rate of firms, and to the non-responses to all our core variables. We were 
able to match only 44% of firms surveyed in the MIP 2009 with the MIP 2011. Furthermore, most of 
the firms surveyed in both waves did not answer all the questions asked, thus reducing the sample for 
which we have information on all the variables we modeled to 1063. A set of robustness checks have 
been performed to exclude the presence of a sample selection bias in our estimates and these will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
3.2 Empirical model and variables description 
Our first research hypothesis is based on the argument that it is required to differentiate between the 
typologies of EI, in particular EREI and ER, to assess the profitability effects of those innovations will 
be tested by confronting the estimations of the model presented in equation (1) and those in equation 
(2)-(4). 
OMi= α + β1EIi + β2 MSi + β3 HHIi + β4 SIZEi + γ SECTi + єi                               
(1) 
OMi= α + β1EREIi + β2 ERi + β3 MSi + β4 HHIi + β5 SIZEi + γ SECTi + єi                       
(2) 
OMi= α + β1EREI + β2 ERi + β3 MSi + β4 HHIi + β5 SIZEi + β6 RDi + β7 LPATi + β8 PCi  
+ γ SECTi + єi                                                                                                                  
(3) 
OMi= α + β1EREI + β2 ERi + β3 MSi + β4 HHIi + β5 SIZEi + β6 RDi + β7 LPATi + β8 PCi  
+ β9 EASTi + γ SECTi + єi                                                                                                 
(4) 
 
Our dependent variable in all the models is firms’ profitability (OM). We model firms’ profitability 
empirically in terms of Returns on Sales by adopting as a dependent variable (OM) the estimated 
operating margin, meant as pre-tax profits over sales (as in Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2010 and Rexhäuser 
and Rammer, 2013). In order to reduce non-responses, OM data are collected through categorical 
values that are self-reported by firms on an interval scale that follows the distribution presented in 
Table 1. As investing in a new environmental technology is probably leading to increasing costs in the 
short run, while its competitive gains in possible terms may only be realised in a subsequent period 
(e.g. Hart and Ahuja 1996, Elsayed and Paton, 2005), we found it more appropriate to expect that the 
adoption of EI in 2006-2008 may engender profitability gains or losses after a certain time lag. For this 
reason, our dependent variable is extracted from a subsequent wave of the survey, the MIP 2011, 
while all the explanatory variables refer to the MIP 2009 wave. The merge of these waves of the 
survey also allows overcoming those endogeneity problems deriving from the simultaneity between 
OM and the explanatory variables and the possible reverse causality issue. More precisely, this merge 
allows to model the estimated operating margins in 2010 (OM) on a set of explanatory variables all 
referred to the time lag 2006-2008. However, the choice of OM as dependent variables still brings 
about a set of issues that need to be discussed. At first, the merge of two waves of the survey might 
engender a selection bias due to the (possible) attrition of firms with similar observable and/or 
unobservable characteristics within the waves as we anticipated when we described the operative 
sample. In the section on the robustness checks this is discussed. Furthermore, the choice of using 
self-reported price-cost margin data instead of more objective data might itself be a limitation. On the 
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other side, it has to be remarked that in Germany the majority of firms were not required to publish 
their accounting data. Consequently, the alternative of using balance sheet data instead of the 
self-reported would have engendered a clear selection bias as only data for large firms, in particular 
stock corporations, would have been available. On the contrary, the use of the Mannheim Innovation 
Panel variable, although self-reported, guarantees the coverage on a representative sample and this is, 
in our opinion, a valid motivation for our choice8.  
Table 1 Distribution Operating Margin 2010 
OM Freq. Percent 
< -5% 60 5.64 
-5% to 2% 38 3.57 
-2% to 0% 59 5.55 
0% to 2% 156 14.68 
2% to 4% 161 15.15 
4% to 7% 216 20.32 
7% to 10% 150 14.11 
10% to 15% 127 11.95 
>15% 96 9.03 
Total 1063 100 
 
Recalling that all the explanatory variables refer to the time lag 2006-2008, to assess the first research 
question, three key environmental dichotomous explanatory variables have been constructed: EI, EREI 
and ER9.  
The first takes value one when at least one process innovation with high environmental benefits has 
been introduced out of a scale of 9 different dimensions (see Table 2), independently on the specific 
nature of the innovation, and is estimated in Equation (1).  
From equation (2) to (4) the environmental innovation variable will be split into EREI and ER in order 
to assess our first research question. EREI takes value one when two conditions are simultaneously 
met: a) the firm has introduced process innovations bringing to a reduction of energy and/or material 
used per unit of output or to a reduction of CO2 emissions and b) this process innovations lead to high 
environmental benefits10. Similarly, ER is equal to one when externality-reducing process innovations 
leading to high environmental protection have been adopted by the firm and zero otherwise. Process 
                                                     
8 We had to test for the possible bias that may arise because of the presence of missing values in the dependent variable. A 
discussion is available in the robustness checks section. 
9 The CIS 2006-2008 introduced an ad-hoc section on Environmental Innovation in which firms were asked to answer 
whether a new or significantly improved product, process, organisational method or marketing method that creates 
environmental benefits were introduced, independently on whether the benefits were the primary objective of the innovation 
or its by-product and independently on whether the innovation was new to the market or just to the firm adopting it. Firms 
were asked to choose among a set of typologies of environmental innovations they might have introduced. The German CIS 
is wider than the harmonised one as it includes more typologies of EI a firm can choose with a set of 9 indicators for process 
innovations, i.e. 3 more than the harmonised CIS, and 3 for product innovations. Furthermore, the German version of the CIS 
allows firms to rank the environmental benefits associated to each typology of EI introduced following a 4-point Likert scale 
(no, small, medium, high environmental benefit). 
10  The questionnaire asks firm to report for each environmental innovation typology introduced its contribution to 
environmental protection out of a low, medium, high scale. As the interest of this analysis lies in the competitiveness effects 
of environmental innovations leading to effective environmental protection, the decision was to focus only on those with high 
effects. In a subsequent step also those with high and medium effects will be considered. 
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innovations that reduce air, soil, water and noise pollution as well as those to replace dangerous 
materials belong to the externality-reducing category. Coherently with previous literature (Rexhäuser 
and Rammer, 2013), process innovations that improve recycling possibilities are not assigned to any of 
the two types mainly because recycling may either be a material-saving innovation (thus EREI) or an 
externality-reducing innovation (ER), depending on whether it saves the usage of materials or water, 
or conversely, it improves the recyclability of wastes11. As in Rexhäuser and Rammer (2013), the CO2 
emission reduction dimension has been assigned to EREI (and not to ER) as it is not feasible to pursue 
any CO2 emission reduction without energy efficiency improvements as the major driver of CO2 
emissions comes from the energy mix used (for a discussion see Cainelli and Mazzanti, forthcoming). 
We acknowledge that CO2 emission reduction innovations are inherently different from energy and 
material reduction ones. For this reason we needed to test a) whether the exclusion of these 
innovations from the analysis and b) whether the assignment of these innovations to the ER category 
would have engendered some changes in the results we provided. Results are stable in both the cases12. 
Lastly, given the nature of the research question, environmental product innovations will be excluded 
from this analysis13. See Table 2 for details in the distributions and composition of EREI and ER and 
the dimensions of EI considered. 
In our baseline specifications in Equation (1) and (2) we control for the Herfindahl concentration 
index (HHI), and for some firm observable heterogeneities (SIZE and MS) taking lagged values from 
the previous wave of the survey to reduce endogeneity problems. As the literature on firms’ 
profitability suggests, highly concentrated markets may pose different competitive conditions to the 
firms, and this might impact on firms’ own profitability. More precisely, previous literature suggests 
that highly concentrated industries, i.e. industries in which a small number of firms account for a great 
number of industrial activities, should show higher profitability possibilities (Capon, Farley and 
Hoenig, 1990). 
Table 2 Key Environmental variables EREI and ER in MIP 2009 
Environmental Process Innovations Share of EI with low, medium or 
high environmental benefits 
Share of EI with high 
environmental benefits 
 Type of 
EI 
Reduced Material per unit of output 37% 5%  EREI 
Reduced energy per unit of output 44% 6%  EREI 
Reduced CO2 footprint 34% 6%  EREI 
Reduced air pollution 24% 4%  ER 
Reduced water pollution 24% 4%  ER 
Reduced soil pollution 15% 2%  ER 
Reduced noise pollution 24% 2%  ER 
Replaced dangerous materials 24% 4%  ER 
Recycled waste, water or materials 39% 5%  None 
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel 2009 
                                                     
11 To be sure that this exclusion does not engender a bias in our results we controlled whether the assignment of the recycled 
waste, water or materials category, first to ER and separately to EREI, would have changed our estimation results. We 
conclude that results are stable in both the cases. A table with these results is available upon request. 
12 A table with these results is available upon request. 
13 The competitiveness returns of new products or services reducing air, water, soil or noise pollution or energy use, or with 
improved recycling possibilities after use will be mainly depending on demand condition rather than on direct efficiency 
gains (EREI) or on direct environmental compliance costs (ER). Their inclusion into either EREI or ER variable might thus 
be misleading in the interpretation of their effect on competitiveness in this specific context. Nevertheless, future research 
might be focused on a different research question whose more accurate focus will allow including environmental product 
innovations. 
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Furthermore, monopolistic markets may predict higher profitability.  Accordingly, the Herfindahl 
concentration index at Sector-level 3-digit calculated by the German Monopoly Commission (HHI), as 
well as self-reported (in MIP) firms market share within the top-selling line of products (MS) have 
been included in the analysis. As a further robustness check, industry concentration measures of the 3 
(C3) and 6 (C6) biggest firms calculated by the German Monopoly Commission has substituted HHI 
and as they showed very similar results, they are no longer included in the tables14. The natural 
logarithm of employees corrected for part time workers is used to control for the size of the firm 
(SIZE). 
Description and descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 3. 
                                                     
14 These tables are available upon request. 
Table 3 Variable description and descriptive Statistics 
variable Description Sourc
e 
Year N Me
an 
Std 
Dev 
Mi
n 
Max 
OM Estimated Operating Margin, i.e. profit before taxes on income as a percentage of 
turnover 
MIP 
2011 
2010 10
63 
5.6
14 
2.12
3 
1 9 
EREI Energy, Material and CO2 reduction process innovations with high environmental 
benefits (Tab. 2) 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
63 
0.1
06 
0.30
8 
0 1 
ER Externality reducing process innovations with high environmental benefits (Tab.2)  MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
63 
0.1
04 
0.30
6 
0 1 
EAST Eastern Germany Location  MIP 
2009 
2008 10
63 
0.3
32 
0.47
1 
0 1 
SIZE Natural Logarithm of employees corrected for the part time workers MIP 
2009 
2008 10
63 
4.0
28 
1.57
7 
0.4
1 
10.2
7 
RD Engagement in internal or external R&D activities MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
63 
0.4
85 
0.50
0 
0 1 
PC Process Innovators MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
63 
0.3
94 
0.48
9 
0 1 
HHI Herfindahl concentration index at 3 Digit (German Monopoly Commission GMC) GMC 2007 10
63 
46.
94
1 
78.5
90 
0.2
1 
644.
05 
LPAT Natural Logarithm of Patent Stock, built according to the perpetual inventory method  PATS
TAT 
1978-2
008 
10
63 
-7.
48
9 
3.71
9 
-9.
21 
6.11 
MS Firm´s market share within the top-selling line of products MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
63 
0.2
75 
0.30
2 
0 1 
EREI_RE
G 
EREI introduced in response to a current or future regulation, excluding overlapping 
assignments that are captured by MIXED_REG 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
22 
0.14
6 
0 1 
ER_REG ER introduced in response to a current or future regulation, excluding overlapping 
assignments that are captured by MIXED_REG 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
39 
0.19
5 
0 1 
EREI_V
OL 
EREI introduced voluntarily, i.e.in response to sectoral voluntary codes or agreements 
for environmental good practices, excluding overlapping assignments that are captured 
by MIXED_VOL 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
17 
0.12
9 
0 1 
ER_VOL ER introduced voluntarily, i.e.in response to sectoral voluntary codes or agreements for 
environmental good practices, excluding overlapping assignments that are captured by 
MIXED_VOL 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
17 
0.12
9 
0 1 
EREI_G
R 
EREI introduced in response to the availability of government grants, subsidies or other 
financial incentives, excluding overlapping assignments that are captured by 
MIXED_GR 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
09 
0.09
4 
0 1 
ER_GR ER introduced in response to the availability of government grants, subsidies or other 
financial incentives, excluding overlapping assignments that are captured by 
MIXED_GR 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
03 
0.05
4 
0 1 
EREI_N
OREG 
EREI introduced but not in response to a current or future regulation MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
55 
0.22
9 
0 1 
ER_NOR
EG 
ER introduced but not in response to a current or future regulation MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
34 
0.18
0 
0 1 
EREI_N
OVOL 
EREI introduced but not in response to sectoral voluntary codes or agreements for 
environmental good practices 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
66 
0.24
9 
0 1 
ER_NOV
OL 
ER introduced but not in response to sectoral voluntary codes or agreements for 
environmental good practices 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
62 
0.24
2 
0 1 
EREI_N
OGR 
EREI introduced but not response to the availability of government grants, subsidies or 
other financial incentives 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
86 
0.28
0 
0 1 
ER_NOG
R 
ER introduced but not response to the availability of government grants, subsidies or 
other financial incentives 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
88 
0.28
3 
0 1 
MIXED_
GR 
EI induced by the existence of government grants, subsidies or other financial 
incentives without the possibility to disentangle EREI from ER as they were both 
introduced in response to this motivation 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
14 
0.11
7 
0 1 
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MIXED_
VOL 
EI introduced voluntarily without the possibility to disentangle EREI from ER as they 
were both introduced in response to this motivation 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
26 
0.15
8 
0 1 
MIXED_
REG 
EI induced by regulation, without the possibility to disentangle EREI from ER as they 
were both introduced in response to this motivation 
MIP 
2009 
2006-2
008 
10
13 
0.0
32 
0.17
5 
0 1 
 
We then add in Equation (3) and in Equation (4) to the baseline specification some further variables 
that may influence firm’ heterogeneous profitability and have been suggested to us by previous 
literature. Given the pairwise correlation outlined in Table 4 we found it more appropriate not to 
proceed with a joint inclusion of all the control variables of the full specified model in Equation (4) as 
some potentially problematic correlations are depicted. 
Table 4 Main Variables Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 OM 1          
2 EREI 0.0627 1         
3 ER 0.0026 0.4411 1        
4 EAST 0.0133 -0.0164 -0.0644 1       
5 SIZE -0.0234 0.1061 0.0713 -0.1439 1      
6 RD 0.0568 0.1291 0.1485 -0.0694 0.2357 1     
7 PC 0.0559 0.1403 0.1715 -0.0537 0.2717 0.4183 1    
8 HHI 0.0083 -0.0081 0.0156 -0.0627 0.1254 0.1338 0.106 1   
9 LPAT 0.0345 0.0672 0.0165 -0.1122 0.3601 0.3621 0.19 0.0757 1  
10 MS 0.0291 0.0195 0.0406 0.0109 -0.0667 -0.0799 -0.1228 0.0502 -0.0381 1 
 
Coherently, in Equation (3) we add to previous controls two variables that capture firms’ technological 
heterogeneities. The first, RD, is a dichotomous variable accounting for the existence of R&D 
activities, either internal or external. We also controlled for firms’ technological heterogeneities 
deriving from differences in the knowledge stock through the natural logarithm of patent stock 
(LPAT), by applying the perpetual inventory method to patent applications at the European Patent 
Office between 1978 and 2008 and depreciating the stock of knowledge capital by a 15% yearly 
discount rate (Griliches and Mairesse, 1984).15 
In Equation (4) we add a control for the role of being a (non-environmental) process innovator with 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the firm introduced (non-environmental) process innovation (PC) 
in the period 2006-200816 and for the East Germany transition process, through a location variable 
(EAST).  
In all the equations 19 sector dummies are included (SECT) (as described in Table A1). 
We can now move to the empirical test of the second hypothesis. Recalling that it suggests that EI 
induced by different determinants heterogeneously affect firms’ profitability, its test is conducted by 
estimating the models in Equations (5) to (7).  
                                                     
15 The presence of many non-patenting firms engenders a limit when computing the natural logarithm of the patent stock. We 
then substituted 0 values with 0.001, by adding 0.001 to patent stock before computing its natural logarithm.    
16 As in Czarnitzki and Kraft (2010) we tried to capture the presence of cartelistic behaviors by adding an interaction variable 
RD* Herfindhal index and the presence of collusion by an interaction variable MS* Herfindhal index. As they were both 
found not to be significant, they are no longer included in the analysis.   
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OMi= α + β1EREI_REGi + β2 ER_ REGi + β3EREI_NOREGi + β4 ER_NO REGi  
+ β5 MIXED_REGi + γ CONTROLSi + єi                                                                (5) 
OMi= α + β1EREI_VOLi + β2 ER_ VOLi + β2EREI_NOVOLi + β3 ER_ NOVOLi  
+ β5 MIXED_VOLi + γ CONTROLSi + єi                                                                (6) 
OMi= α + β1EREI_GRi + β2 ER_ GRi + β3EREI_NOGRi + β4 ER_ NOGRi + 
 β5 MIXED_GRi + γ CONTROLSi + єi                                                                    (7) 
 
The rationale is to include in these Equations (5) to (7) all the controls of the full specified model of 
the previous Equation (4), which are now synthetically labeled CONTROLS, and to modify the key 
environmental innovation variables. Those will be included separately to avoid multicollinearity 
among those environmental innovation regressors.  
To test our second hypothesis, we consequently built a group of EREI and ER variables that differ 
according to the motivation behind their adoption. The MIP 2009 asks the firms to state whether an EI 
was introduced as a response to a list of determinants, among which we are interested in: a) an existing 
or a foreseen regulation, which allows us to create the regulation-induced variables (EREI_REG and 
ER_REG) and the non-regulation induced (EREI_NOREG and ER_NOREG); b)  the availability of 
government grants, subsidies, or other financial incentives to EI, which allowed us to build our grant 
induced variables (EREI_GR and ER_GR) as well as the non-grant induced ones (EREI_NOGR and 
ER_NOGR) and c) voluntary codes or agreements for environmental good practices, through which we 
built our voluntary agreements variables (EREI_VOL and ER_VOL) as well as the non-voluntary 
agreements driven ones (EREI_NOVOL and ER_NOVOL)17. The survey does not allow to properly 
distinguish between a regulation that induced EREI from one that induced ER, it only gives 
information on whether an EI (general) has been induced by regulation and this applies to grants and 
voluntary codes as well. In the case of regulation, we could not univocally assign 180 
regulation-induced innovations either to EREI or to ER. In the case of voluntary codes, the number of 
ambiguous assignments is 152, while it is 64 in the case of grant-driven innovations. For this reason 
we include in each specification in equation (3) to (5) a variable for those situations in which an 
ambiguous assignment was depicted, i.e. in the cases in which REG, GR or VOL induced both EREI 
and ER (MIXED_REG; MIXED_GR and MIXED_VOL). We consequently replace those EREI and ER 
with zero for which the assignment was ambiguous not to double count them in the estimations. The 
underlying rationale for such a structure is to have in each equation as complement to one only the 
non-introduction of any EI18 in order to use it as the benchmark to interpret the coefficients of the 
dummy variables we included in the models.   
                                                     
17 The sample slightly changes when moving to the extended specification in Equation (5) to (7) because of some missing 
values in the answers provided by respondents on the motivations for EI. The number of observations available for testing the 
second hypothesis is 1013 instead of 1063, as in Table 6. 
18 For each EREI and ER we can indeed have the following situations: non EI (EREI or ER equal to 0), EI driven by one of 
the three motivations (EREI or ER equal to one; motivation -REG, GR or VOL- equal to one, EI not driven (EREI or ER equal 
to one; motivation equal to zero). Moreover for each motivation we have a mixed category we described as MIXED above. In 
the case of regulation, for instance, we have overall the following categories: EREI_REG, EREI_NOREG, ER_REG, 
ER_NOREG, MIXED_REG; NO_EREI; NO_ER. If we had included in the regressions only EREI_REG and ER_REG, we 
could have not been able to disentangle the profitability effect among a) EREI or ER which were not driven by REG, b) 
MIXED EI driven by REG and c) non-EI firms. For this reason we included in the regressions also EREI_NOREG, 
ER_NOREG and MIXED_REG, so as to keep as benchmark (complement to one) the only category of non-EI.  
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Given that our dependent variable is a categorical variable with the known thresholds as outlined in 
Table 1, we can estimate it through an interval regression model, which allows us to model fixed and 
known cut points, which are in our case both left and right censored, and estimate the coefficients and 
δ² via Maximum Likelihood19 (Wooldridge, 2002).  
4 Results, discussion and robustness checks 
 
Estimation results of Equation (1) to (4) are provided in Table 5. Recalling that column (I) reports the 
results when the EI variable does not make any differentiation on the nature of the innovation itself, 
we find that in general the adoption of an EI does not play any effect on firms’ profitability.  
Table 5 Estimation Results (I) 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
     
     
EI 0.3976    
 (0.4984)    
EREI  1.8502*** 1.7776*** 1.7403*** 
  (0.6578) (0.6591) (0.6579) 
ER  -1.1512* -1.1915* -1.2831* 
  (0.6753) (0.6821) (0.6795) 
SIZE -0.0408 -0.0504 -0.1114 -0.1457 
 (0.1305) (0.1306) (0.1383) (0.1397) 
MS 0.6053 0.6266 0.6088 0.6964 
 (0.7713) (0.7633) (0.7627) (0.7662) 
HHI -0.0041 -0.0040 -0.0041 -0.0044 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
RD   0.4938 0.2890 
   (0.4558) (0.4832) 
LPAT   0.0470 0.0469 
   (0.0630) (0.0629) 
EAST    -0.0468 
    (0.4208) 
PC    0.5902 
    (0.4520) 
Constant 2.8375*** 2.8254*** 3.2666*** 3.3091*** 
 (0.9344) (0.9399) (1.1847) (1.1855) 
lnsigma     
Constant 1.8180*** 1.8146*** 1.8136*** 1.8126*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0281) 
N 1063 1063 1063 1063 
MLCox-Snell R2 0.055 0.061 0.063 0.065 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
19 Sector Dummies, jointly significant (Wald Test), have been included 
 
                                                     
19 We further checked the validity of our results by transforming the dependent variable in a Likert scale one, which ranges 
from 0 to 9 and we estimated the same models with Ordered Probit and Ordinary Least Squares. As expected results remain 
unaltered. Those are available upon request.  
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If we had stopped here, we would have concluded that a neutral relationship has been depicted 
between EI and profitability and that it does not pay to be green. But when we decompose EI by EREI 
and ER, we instead find a clear confirmation of our first research hypothesis, namely that it is 
appropriate to differentiate between Energy and Resource-Efficient innovation and the 
Externality-Reducing ones as different profitability effects are expected. More precisely, EREI are 
exerting a positive and strongly significant effect on firms’ profitability, while on the contrary, ER are 
negatively impacting firms’ operating margins (column (II)). This result is robust to the subsequent 
inclusion of additional control variables (column (III) and (IV)). The expectation that increased 
resource efficiency engenders a positive economic effect is confirmed.  On the one side EREI are 
innovations that in reducing the use of materials and energy they reduce production costs. On the other 
side different combinations in the use of these idiosyncratic resources can engender a competitive 
advantage that a firm can exploit in the market. The magnitude of the positive gain is so depending on 
the way these two intertwined mechanisms are at work. ERs are conversely neither associated to a cost 
reduction in the production nor to possible competitive advantages deriving from the exploitation of 
strategic resources. In general adopting an innovation is a costly process for the firm and when those 
innovations are ER, the costs actually overcome the benefits in a way that the profitability return of 
such an adoption becomes negative. 
To better appreciate the results outlined above, we now exploit the information on what is the 
motivation behind the adoption of EI and test our second research hypothesis by estimating Equation 
(5) to (7). Results are reported in Table 6.  
What emerges is that the motivation behind the adoption of an EI makes the difference in terms of 
profitability gains, given a first confirmation of the validity of our second research hypothesis.  
When an EI is introduced as a response to a current of future regulation (EREI_REG and ER_REG) 
with respect to the case in which it is not driven by regulation (EREI_NOREG and ER_NOREG), ER is 
still hampering firms’ competitiveness, coherently with our previous results, while EREI remains 
positive and significant. This last result is coherent with the Porter Hypothesis framework of analysis, 
according to which regulation may help firms in seeking new production solutions that allow them to 
more than offset the costs of compliance and to take advantage of competitive gains that derive from 
that. However, to properly account for the existence of a Porter-like mechanism, a proper and 
well-designed regulation might be at stake, while we have no information on the quality of the 
regulation we are accounting for in our data20. As regulation typically induces firms to internalise their 
externalities, the interpretation of our results can be the following: when regulation works only in the 
direction of reducing production externalities forcing firms to engage in ER, then it can actually 
hamper firms’ profitability. On the other side, when regulation induces firms to improve their resource 
efficiency, it results in productivity gains for the firms. Moreover, EREI and ER introduced not as a 
response to environmental regulation do not affect firms’ profitability.  
More interestingly and coherently with the previous result, when EI are introduced in response to the 
availability of government grants, subsidies, or other financial incentives, their effect on 
competitiveness are confirmed to be negative for ER, and no longer significant for EREI. This result 
can be interpreted by considering that a financial incentive is usually paid for innovations that are not 
profitable on their own.  
                                                     
20 Furthermore, this is out of the scope of the current paper. 
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Table 6 Estimation Results (II): EI disentangled by drivers 
 (I) (II) (III) 
    
    
EREI_REG 1.7726*   
 (1.0424)   
ER_REG -1.8817**   
 (0.9110)   
EREI_NOREG 1.3738   
 (1.0072)   
ER_NOREG -0.7887   
 (1.4041)   
MIXED_REG 0.9503   
 (0.9100)   
EREI_VOL  1.1825  
  (1.3684)  
ER_VOL  -1.8301  
  (1.4693)  
EREI_NOVOL  2.0289**  
  (0.8007)  
ER_NOVOL  -1.1232  
  (0.8536)  
MIXED_VOL  0.2572  
  (1.1979)  
EREI_GR   0.2980 
   (1.0669) 
ER_GR   -6.7765*** 
   (1.7819) 
EREI_NOGR   2.0365*** 
   (0.7451) 
ER_NOGR   -1.0242 
   (0.7398) 
MIXED_GR   -0.4049 
   (1.6742) 
SIZE -0.1190 -0.1175 -0.1131 
 (0.1422) (0.1422) (0.1419) 
RDdum 0.2106 0.2103 0.2054 
 (0.4964) (0.4962) (0.4966) 
LPAT 0.0421 0.0464 0.0452 
 (0.0636) (0.0643) (0.0639) 
MS 1.0802 1.0674 1.0048 
 (0.7899) (0.7912) (0.7924) 
HHI -0.0057* -0.0058* -0.0056* 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) 
EAST -0.0670 -0.0772 -0.0446 
 (0.4312) (0.4327) (0.4314) 
PC 0.6033 0.5867 0.5716 
 (0.4661) (0.4675) (0.4651) 
Constant 3.1272** 3.1468*** 3.0722** 
 (1.2163) (1.2157) (1.2092) 
lnsigma    
Constant 1.8085*** 1.8088*** 1.8068*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0286) (0.0287) 
N 1013 1013 1013 
MLCox-Snell R2 0.065 0.065 0.067 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
19 Sector Dummies, jointly significant (Wald Test), have been included 
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And it is mainly paid for adopting ER innovation rather than EREI, since EREI may not be eligible for 
state aids with the same frequency. In line with this reasoning, EREI are proved to engender positive 
profitability effects only when they are not introduced as a response to a financial incentive 
(EREI_NOGR is positive and significant). Furthermore, the negative effect of ER on profitability is 
higher than that reported in Table 5, suggesting that the negative profitability effect of ER is even 
stronger when those innovations are motivated by the presence of a financial incentive. The 
explanation might lay in the lack of an “additionality” effect of this subsidy or grant. In other terms, 
some firms may opportunistically substitute innovations undertaken as a response to the incentive 
while, at the same time, abandon any further innovation activity. This behavior might end up with 
stronger losses for the firm. A proper test on the grant additionality is however not possible in this 
context for the absence of specific data.  
Lastly, when the driver of the adoption is the presence of voluntary codes or agreements, no effects on 
competitiveness are depicted. Intuitively the adoption of such voluntary codes is intertwined with 
organizational costs, which are not necessarily making the adoption itself profitable. On the other side, 
EREI that are not introduced as a response to voluntary codes or agreements of conduct exert a 
significant and positive role on the dependent variable (EREI_NOVOL is positive and significant).  
We previously built our EREI and ER variables by accounting only for those innovations having a 
high environmental impact. If we instead include also those innovations reporting medium or high 
environmental benefits, then we can shed more light on the nature of the relationship between EI and 
profitability. In Table 7 we report estimation results of Equation (1) and (2) in which we replaced 
respectively EI and EREI-ER by adopting a more extensive category of EI, to include also those with 
medium environmental impact. What we find is that none of the key environmental variables is still 
significantly affecting firms’ profitability. This suggests not only that the question whether it pays or 
not to be green should be better qualified as profitability effects arise not in general. More 
interestingly, it suggests that a minimum threshold of (green) innovativeness is required before 
profitability gains arise. Profitability effects might indeed arise only for firms introducing highly 
innovative innovations, i.e. innovation whose impact on the environment is strong, while it does not 
arise for the entire spectrum of EI one might consider. 
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Table 7 Estimation results (III): EI with medium or high environmental benefits 
 (I) (II) 
   
   
EI (medium_or_high) -0.1600  
 (0.4212)  
EREI (medium_or_high)  -0.0735 
  (0.4687) 
ER (medium_or_high)  0.1350 
  (0.4851) 
SIZE -0.1314 -0.1355 
 (0.1399) (0.1412) 
RD 0.3238 0.2972 
 (0.4887) (0.4868) 
LPAT 0.0548 0.0560 
 (0.0633) (0.0633) 
MS 0.6691 0.6573 
 (0.7758) (0.7778) 
HHI -0.0045 -0.0044 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) 
EAST -0.0023 0.0088 
 (0.4224) (0.4212) 
PC 0.6255 0.5813 
 (0.4609) (0.4592) 
Constant 3.4456*** 3.4098*** 
 (1.1939) (1.1902) 
Lnsigma   
Constant 1.8161*** 1.8161*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) 
N 1063 1063 
MLCox-Snell R2 0.052 0.052 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
19 Sector Dummies, jointly significant (Wald Test), have been included 
 
Several robustness checks have been implemented to support the validity of our estimation results. 
At first, we consider that firms may be reluctant in providing profit information data. Indeed, among 
the 6851 firms of the MIP2011, 1451 did not answer to the operating margin variable and 703 stated 
that it was unknown. To test for the presence of a bias that may arise from the missing values 
encountered in our dependent variable OM, we constructed a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when 
information on OM are provided and 0 otherwise and we modeled the probability of providing 
information on OM through a probit model and regressed it on all the explanatory variables in 
equation (2), rejecting the null Hypothesis that the non-response to OM is random (as in Rexhäuser 
and Rammer 2013). As the variable that is driving the non-randomness of the non-responses is EAST, 
significant in the probit model, it has been selected to construct the exclusion restriction in a two-step 
Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). The coefficient of the mills ratio in the Heckman model 
is not statistically significant. This suggested that a proper selection bias is not depicted in our sample 
data and that the estimation model we selected above was more appropriate. However, the results we 
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presented were confirmed by this selection model, as EREI and ER were both reporting the expected 
signs and were both significant21. 
As we have anticipated, the non-response to all the variables in the sample restricted our operative 
sample to only 1063 observations. We then controlled that the operative sample did not systematically 
differ from the full sample in the mean of the main variables included into the analysis, which are 
reported in Table A2. We see that our results are robust as the dependent variable (OM) and our main 
explanatory variables (EREI, ER and EI) do not present significant differences in the means between 
the sample we used in the regression and the full sample (that is representative of the population).22 
5 Conclusion 
Whether it pays or not to be green has been a core topic of the empirical literature on environmental 
and economic performance over the past two decades and assessing this question contributes to 
evaluate whether it is possible to maintain economic growth without giving up to increasing 
environmental performances. With a focus on the firm level and by analyzing survey data for the 
German firms, we contribute to this debate by showing that the question needs to be better qualified if 
we want to empirically operationalise it. Our main finding is that it is indeed more appropriate to open 
the box of the environmental realm and separately consider the competitive gains of different 
typologies of EI, those reducing externalities from those increasing energy and resources efficiency. It 
depends on how to be green. 
If we look at innovations leading to a reduction in the use of energy and resources, we can conclude 
that it definitely pays to be green. If we then turn to innovations aimed at reducing externalities, such 
as harmful materials and air, water, noise and soil pollutions, we should conclude that it does not pay 
to be green. Although it may be profitable in the long run due to improved environmental regulation, it 
does not pay off in the short run when environmental regulation has to be faced as an external 
restriction. Energy and Resource Efficient innovations are here confirmed to lead to potential “win 
win” situations, in which reducing the environmental impact of production is contextually improving 
firms’ economic performances. The same conclusion does not hold for externality reducing 
innovations, for which the cost burden of the adoption of the innovation seems to overcome the 
potential gains. A threshold of green innovativeness seems to be at stake and this discriminates 
between profitable innovations and not profitable one. Only highly (green) innovative firms are indeed 
found to benefit from the adoption of EREI. When looking at the drivers that work behind the 
adoption of each typology of EI considered, we confirm that the motivation inducing their adoption 
significantly impacts the profitability effects of the innovations. Again, this confirms our main 
hypothesis of the need to better articulate the question to allow identifying specific heterogeneous 
patterns that we found in our data. Lastly, a Porter-like mechanism emerges as far as regulation 
induced EREI are concerned, confirming previous results in the field (Rexhäuser and Rammer, 2013).  
The current work suffers however of a set of limitations we could not solve. 
One of the main limitations of this analysis lies in the cross-sectional nature of the data. Although the 
merge of two subsequent waves of the Mannheim Innovation Panel allows to include an appropriate 
                                                     
21 These results are not reported here but are available upon request. 
22 We also recognise that some of the control variables we included (HHI, RD, SIZE, PC, EAST and LPAT) are 
significantly different in the 2 samples. Although this might change the coefficients of those variables in our 
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time lag between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, so as to overcome endogeneity 
issues, it is still reasonable to assume that profitability is also depending on firms’ unobserved 
heterogeneity, for instance, on technology level or managerial quality, that a panel analysis setting 
would have allowed to control for. Unfortunately, the key environmental variables were only available 
for the 2009 wave, thus limiting a panel exploitation of the data. The best effort was made in trying to 
capture the majority of elements driving to observed heterogeneity by adding a set of lagged 
comprehensive controls, but the room for unobserved heterogeneity is still open and it is not possible 
to model for it accurately in a cross section setting.  
On the other side, the great advantage of this analysis lies in the use of specific survey data on the 
adoption of environmental innovation, which allows overcoming the limits of previous studies 
deriving from the need to find adequate proxies for EI.   
Another (smaller) limitation lies in the specific time frame we considered. Although Germany is one 
of the European countries who recovered faster from the economic downturn and that it is 
consequently acceptable to assume that values of competitiveness in 2010 have not been underpinned 
by the crisis, it would have been preferred to account for that in the empirical strategy. Unfortunately, 
for such a structural break test to be implemented, a time-series data dimension would have been 
required, and, once again, this dataset does not allow covering such an issue.  
Future research might be also directed to further investigate the competitiveness effects of different 
typologies of EI by focusing on specific technology fields through a patent-based analysis instead of a 
survey one. That would allow to look more deeply into the technology of each innovation generated 
and to differentiate between the competitiveness effects engendered by ER technologies and EREI 
technologies.  Another interesting future line of research, if these data will be available, would be to 
apply panel data methodologies on a panel dataset which collects information on EI for more than one 
subsequent wave. That would also allow controlling for those unobserved firms’ heterogeneities that 
might impact on firms’ profitability that we could not completely take into consideration in the current 
work. 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regression results, we do not consider it a limitation to our analysis as they were just included as control 
variables and we have not even commented their potentially biased coefficients. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Sector Variables and Distribution 
 
Description Sector NACE Rev 2.0 Frequency Percentage 
Agriculture, mining, quarrying A; B 23 2.16 
Food, Beverages, Tobacco C10-C12 38 3.57 
Textile, Leather and wearing app C13-C15 30 2.82 
Wood, paper and printing C16-C18 (Bench) 51 4.8 
Chemicals, Coke and petroleum products C19-C20 30 2.82 
Pharmaceutical industry C21 7 0.66 
Rubber, plastic and o.n.m.p. C21-C23 67 6.3 
Basic and fabricated metals C24-C25 84 7.9 
Computer, Electronic and optical products C26 72 6.77 
Electrical equipment C27 28 2.63 
Machinery and equipment and o.m. C28; C32; C33 128 12.04 
Motor Vehicles and other transport eq. C29-C30 34 3.2 
Furniture C31 17 1.6 
Electricity and Water supply D-E 93 8.75 
Construction F 13 1.22 
Wholesale and retail G 62 5.83 
Transport and communication H-J 110 10.35 
Banking, assurances, renting services K-L; N 98 9.22 
R&D, consulting, education and other se M; O-T 78 7.34 
Total   1063 100 
 
 
 
 
Tab A2 Differences in the Variables’ means between Operative and Full sample 
 
 
 
variable 
N  Mean  N  Mean  
Operative sample Operative sample Full sample Full sample 
OM 1063 5.614299 2274 5.611258 
EREI 1063 0.1063029 6369 0.103941 
ER 1063 0.1044214 6313 0.0947252 
EI 1063 0.1702728 6400 0.1639063 
EAST * 1063 0.332079 7061 0.3084549 
SIZE * 1063 4.0275 6319 3.646109 
RD * 1063 0.4854186 7061 0.4112732 
PC * 1063 0.3941675 7061 0.3444271 
HHI * 1063 46.94077 7045 44.67348 
LPAT * 1063 -7.488904 7061 -7.834 
MS 1063 0.2750892 3391 0.2680772 
Variables with * are significantly different between the samples with a confidence level of 95%  
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